Perhaps, no Russia-created myth about Ukraine remains as deeply ingrained in our memory and sense-making as ‘Ukrainians and Russians are fraternal peoples[1]’. Several generations of Ukrainians have grown up being sure they have historic similarities and a connection with Russians that has never really been there. In reality, the statements about ‘fraternal peoples’ are a product of propaganda based on a range of narratives about the countries Russia considers its ‘area of influence’ and has been unsuccessfully trying to return under its control – with Ukraine being one of the countries it’s particularly anxious to ‘make its own again’[2]. Understanding the motivations of Russia, a state with a legacy of authoritarianism[3] and consistently strong ideological opposition to democratic values[4], is key to make sense of such narratives and the logic behind them. For the broader understanding of inherent differences between Russian and Ukrainian peoples, cross-cultural studies provide evidence-based insights, as ~50% of variation in national cultural orientations is unique to the country and is rooted in the lasting differences in historic developmental trajectories – despite the effects of globalization and international economic cooperation[5]. Of particular interest for understanding the said differences is the relationship between individualism and collectivism in Russian and Ukrainian cultures and its respective impact on the institutions, as these dimensions are found to be one of the most distinctive for cultural variation – i.e. responsible for a great deal of differences between national cultures[6]. The purpose of this article is to show, using evidence from cross-cultural studies, that the peoples of Ukraine and Russia differ significantly on the individualism-collectivism dimension and could not be less ‘fraternal’. Considering the relative scarcity of peer-reviewed research on Ukrainian national culture, the conclusions are based on the combination of sources from academic papers, international analytical organizations, and independent media.
As the levee steers the river: how national culture shapes and ‘cements’ a country’s institutions
National culture takes shape in the course of centuries, influenced by the country’s landscape, climate, location, wars and ruling regimes, societal interaction and stratification and is rather path-dependent or, in simple terms, resistant to change[7]. Because national culture repeatedly manifests on individual and societal levels in specific ways, it primarily shapes institutions – the mechanisms of making social choices, distributing political influence, and enduring regularity of behavior, which can be formal (rules, laws, and their enforcement mechanisms) and informal (self-regulation, codes of ethics and conduct, conventions, deeply embedded social norms)[8]. However, once the institutions have developed and taken root, they begin to further ‘steer’ national culture – as the levee steers and contains the river – thus, preventing rapid and abrupt cultural shifts[9]. Because institutions structure social interaction of people by endorsing shared and legitimate understandings of reality[10] (what is happening and what to make of it), unless a profound institutional changes takes place, no significant changes in the national culture can happen.
Let’s take the phenomenon of corruption as an example. Personal networks and clan structures established in Tsarist Russia (which re-emerged among the new ruling classes in Soviet times and then among the political elite in the 90’s) to guard the individual interests of their participants, combined with the deeply embedded attitude of ‘legal nihilism’[11], undermine the functioning of formal bureaucracy and serve as breeding ground for corruption to this day.[12] The general underlying principle behind Russia’s corruption is “enrich those above you in the hierarchy and maintain your loyalty as you work to enrich yourself”[13] – with corruption being a way to climb up the societal vertical, strengthening connections with the ‘right’ people along the way and paying the ‘toll’ to the higher-ups as a token of loyalty. In such a society, appealing to those in power becomes increasingly more important than ‘doing one’s job’[14], and until the pattern of these informal non-transparent relationships persists, it will hinder the development and the functioning of formal transparent institutions.
In case of Ukraine, corruption has different institutional causes – it’s predominantly rooted in distrust in the government institutions’ ability to systemically perform their functions. When Ukraine’s territory was split between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the respective territories followed different development patterns: in the West, the Habsburgs were fostering the Ukrainian community as a counterweight against the Poles, while in the East, the Romanovs suppressed all local identities. Consequently, distinctly different views of Ukraine’s geopolitical role and voting behavior persist today in the respective territories. One has been gravitating towards Russia, the other – towards Europe in terms of national identity, cultural orientation, strength of community bonds, and civic engagement, transmitted largely through informal institutions, such as families and communities[15]. Family and local community, as key ‘circles of trust’, are still the most powerful informal institutions in Ukraine, with the government institutions having the lowest trust ratings since 1991, when Ukraine gained independence, till today: 37.5% of Ukrainians trust in state institutions, 19.8% trust the judiciary, 34.6% trust the police, and 30.1% trust other Ukrainians they meet for the first time (with the exception of the Armed Forces with 70.1% level of trust)[16].
The ’layered cake’ of national culture: how possible is the change and why does it take so long?
To make sense of how national culture can change, one must consider its three levels, which underpin each other and have different ‘modification’ periods.
For the national culture to profoundly shift, change must happen on its deepest level – “underlying assumptions”[17], the sense-making templates society reproduces ‘by default’ from generation to generation, which take centuries to change[18].
For instance, among the underlying assumptions of the Ukrainian national culture is freedom [volya / svoboda] – ability to make important decisions without pressure or coercion[19], characterized primarily by flexible and non-obligatory view of rules and limitations[20] with equality, fairness, and responsibility being less important than freedom[21]. In contrast, among the underlying assumptions of the Russian nationalculture are the lack of autonomy among the population in decision-making and violence as a means of ensuring obedience and deference. Interaction patterns are “vertical” – coercive, rather than ‘horizontal’ – dialogue-based[22]: “forcing instead of convincing”, “imposing instead of explaining”, “compromise equals weakness”[23].
The next level of national culture manifestation in societal interaction and individual sense-making contains “beliefs and values”, the moving principles that ‘signal’ how one should interact with their environment in specific situations and take decades to change[24]. Numerous studies, particularly by Inglehart, Beugelsdijk and Welzel, show – though beliefs and values do shift, this change is not radical, but rather follows the path established by the underlying assumptions of a specific national culture.
The key differences in the beliefs and values of Ukrainians and Russians manifest through the attitudes towards the concepts of leadership, autonomy, and national identity, underpinned by Russia’s legacy of authoritarianism[25] and Ukraine’s lack of such legacy[26]:
Rulers / leaders: In Russian culture, the ability to dominate through substantive and procedural rule-breaking, interfere with subordinates’ preferences the without the need to justify accountability to the them[27] are the key signs of an authoritative figure, and subordinating one’s interests to those of senior ‘in-group’ members is not only normal, but expected by default[28].
In Ukrainian culture, a leader will have authority if the subordinates believe he or she considers their interests when making decisions – a belief that’s been part of the country’s institutional tissue even during the Soviet times[29]. If a leader loses legitimacy, they can be overthrown, which happened regularly in Ukraine’s history, including the three revolutions (‘On Granite’ (1990), ‘Orange’ (2004), ‘Euromaidan’ (2014) during the last 30 years alone.
Population’s decision-making autonomy: According to GLOBE Project data, the key practical manifestation of Russia’s national culture values include inability to obtain the desired result without aggression, low consideration for moral principles and ethics, problem-, rather than performance-orientation, and lack of humane orientation – overall and in leader-subordinate relations[30]. To put it simply, the desired state of Russian masses can be described as the ‘learned helplessness’, when the key life-related decisions are delegated to be made by the narrow circle of high-level people in the respective community and then ‘cascaded’ down for execution with no effort to discuss or persuade – all peculiar to authoritarian states[31].
In Ukrainian society, the ability to make decisions without pressure or coercion is the key criterion of the quality of life – largely due to the tradition of resolving political disagreements through negotiations (not consolidation of power)[32] and strongly regional distribution of political power[33]. Ukrainian culture, though collectivist and hierarchical, is characterized by 56% of citizens expecting the government to provide equal conditions and opportunities with the responsibility of using those resting with each individual and the top-4 values considered most important (after freedom) being fairness, security, equality, and dignity.[34]
National identity: After the USSR collapsed, Russia has lost any remnants of the national idea (which earlier revolved around maintaining the country’s ‘grandeur’ through subduing other countries) and has been trying to 'make itself great again' since then by ‘saving the Russian-speaking people’ in the adjacent countries it considers ‘younger brothers’ who need to ‘return home’[35]. The latest vivid example of the lacking national idea in Russia is the phenomenon of ‘pobedabesiye’ – the meme denoting obsession with Russia’s supposed victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and claim that ‘one nation’ won that war, thus, denying Ukraine’s agency in this fundamental event. It manifests in Russia’s propaganda narratives aimed at justifying its attempts to coercively impose pro-Russian values and culture on Ukraine and juxtaposing Russia and its ‘younger underdeveloped ‘brothers’ [Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova] to the ‘collective West[36]’.
Not only Ukraine has never shown signs of the imperial ambitions or features, but contempt towards anything authoritarian is deeply embedded in its national culture, while the national idea (albeit not formalized and not yet legitimized via public nation-wide discussions) has always revolved around freedom [volya / svoboda], agency, and absence of coercion. Specifically, no overarching nondemocratic national identity emerged in Ukraine after USSR collapse, but competing notions and sources of national identity existed, none being compelling enough to monopolize power and to impose its views and visions on the society as a whole[37].
The most visible level of national culture is “behavior and artifacts”[38], including expectations, norms, and symbols that signify the desired and undesired formats of societal interactions and take years to change. Behavior and artifacts are relatively the most prone to change of all levels of the national culture, however, that change is superficial and non-fundamental. Neither temporary changes in behavior, nor mimicking not shared beliefs and values (even under pressure) are able to change the national culture until its underlying assumptions change.
Among the most vivid differences in the behavioral norms of Russians and Ukrainians is the expression of one’s will and speaking up. Since February 24th, 2022, Russia, with population of ~140 million, demonstrated remarkable population’s passivity and the lack of mass protests, while Ukraine with ~1/4th of Russia’s population has had three revolutions that deeply affected the society in the last 30 years alone. However, there is nothing surprising in such a state of affairs, as Russia is among the most atomized (incongruent) societies in the world, where, as below-quoted studies show, a citizen is, in fact, a ‘subject’ lacking the agency of systemic impact on their life and having no illusions of having it.
VoxUkraine research shows that 87% of Russians (compared to 95% of Ukrainians) declare to feel affiliation with their state (being ‘Russian’ or ‘Ukrainian’), 81% of Russians (and 85% of Ukrainians) feel members of their local communities, 24% of Russians (and 31% of Ukrainians) trust their fellow countrymen with whom they are not personally acquainted[39].
InfoSapiens Research shows that 66% of Russians support the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine, 71% feel the said ‘special operation’ is fair, 69% feel pride, and 64% feel confidence in the ‘special operation’. Only 12% of Russians feel ashamed of the ‘special operation’. 22% of Russians admit the complete inability to influence their own life (10% of Ukrainians feel the same). However, while 30% of Russians believe ‘Russia should stop the ‘special operation’, only 19% said they would stop the ’special operation’ if this decision was theirs to make[40].
Cubic watermelon or ‘I have my washing machine, my summer house is renovated, now where’s my empire?”[41]
If Russia and Ukraine are so different then why do several flagship systems analyzing national cultures[42] (particularly, Hofstede[43], GLOBE, Trompenaars[44],[45],[46], Hall[47],[48]) show these two countries as having nearly identical cultural dimensions and similar trajectories of values’ evolution? The metaphoric answer to this complex question lies in the way Japanese farmers grow watermelons that are convenient to store and transport. In Japan, young watermelons are put in dense cubic baskets[49] and, while ripening, they gain cubic shape, retaining other watermelon-like qualities.
What does national culture have to do with cubic watermelons? – one may rightly ask. See, it’s the country’s institutions that play the decisive role in how its values and beliefs manifest through regular behaviors – the very institutions the country’s culture shaped in the first place[50]. If the country’s formal institutions are effective (perform their function with no need to look for ‘shortcuts’), legitimate (accepted by citizens, not imposed on them), society-oriented (instead of self-preserving at any cost), congruent (do not contradict social norms), and accountable (checks and balances exist), they will function differently and will produce different behaviors than they would, had the said characteristics been the opposite[51]. In other words, formal institutions are only effective if congruent with a country’s beliefs, values, and social norms, which, akin to how the said cubic basket shapes a watermelon, shape the patterns of behaviors peculiar to the specific national culture.
Further quoted research shows that the key (though not all) differences between cultures of Russia and Ukraine revolve around the institutionally ‘programmed’ cultural dimensions on societal and individual levels, though several (not all) dimensions of these two countries’ cultures rank similarly. In Hofstede system, Ukraine and Russia are shown to have comparable levels of power distance (tolerance of power inequality in society), uncertainty avoidance (how threatening ambiguous situations are), and long-term orientation (strength of links between past and present, degree of pragmatism in following traditions)[52]. In Trompenaars’ system, both countries are collectivist, particularistic, emotional, ascription-oriented, and synchronic[53][54].
DIFFERENCE #1. Ukraine is a democracy with disdain for autocracy, while Russia is an autocracy with disdain for democracy.
Russia is an authoritarian state that hasn’t had either significant periods of democratic rule throughout its history, or actionable interest in democratic societal norms[55]. In a personalist autocracy, which Russia is, the key decisions are made by one person (the last dictator of similar type was Stalin[56]), and studies show that only ~12,5% of such dictators lose power relatively quickly and usually through death – with or without help from their closest generals – or coup[57]. For Russia, democracy is an irrelevant and dangerous regime because it encourages autonomous thinking of the wider population, which, consequently, becomes less controllable through pressure and coercion[58].
In Russian culture, it’s not only important to differentiate from others through status, but to dominate over those on the lower hierarchy levels (to the point of resorting to violence) and to demonstrate one’s capability of ensuring deference, which gives access to interaction with those of comparable status[59]; representatives of ‘out-groups’ in such a society are ‘alien’ and, therefore, are ‘enemies’.
Ukraine – on the contrary, has always been fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism, particularly due to historic factors, including frequent change of rulers (local and conquerors) with varying political stances, which have led to distinctly different paths of institutional development, sets of political behaviors and ‘national idea’ views[60]; democratic norms developed in regions that were under Austro-Hungarian rule[61]; active dissident movement of 1960’s, and regionalism combined with consensus-seeking politics that were peculiar to Ukraine on the verge of USSR collapse[62]. Besides, Ukraine has never existed long enough (i.e. centuries) in the same borders and under albeit several generations of similar rulers – to develop embedded approaches to statehood of any kind, let alone authoritarian. Currently Ukraine is classified by Freedom House as a ‘hybrid regime’ (partially free), with a significant freedom-diminishing factor being Russian annexation of Crimea and conquered territories in 2014 and after February 22, 2022[63].
For Ukrainians, it is important to be successful and differentiate from others through status, but focus is on protecting one’s interests rather than dominating over others. All this has to happen in synch with the ‘in-group’ goals[64], belonging to which improves the quality of life and allows to productively interact with (often) ineffective institutions. Sacrificing one’s interests for the those of the ‘in-group’ is not a ‘default’ expectation, but a conscious choice involving consideration of one’s goals and status[65]; representatives of ‘out-groups’ are ‘alien’, but are not necessarily ‘enemies’.
DIFFERENCE #2. Collectivism in Ukraine and Russia is not of the same kind.
Though both Russia and Ukraine are predominantly collectivist cultures (in all flagship systems of cross-cultural analysis), the type of collectivism in these societies is not the same and individualism also manifests differently.
Ukraine historically has been a vertically collectivist society due to the high power distance, relatively conservative and hierarchical orthodox religion foundations, and high uncertainty avoidance, all of which have caused a heightened need to control ‘what happens tomorrow’ and to always ‘save for the rainy day’[66]. Further, the embedded intolerance of authoritarianism and the complexities of territory formation, coupled with parts of Ukraine being occupied by the two culturally different empires have produced the ‘mix’ of the two types of collectivism: vertical (imposed hierarchy, dominance) and horizontal (legitimized in-group hierarchy, dialogue)[67]. This mix of collectivisms in Ukraine is additionally balanced by but notably manifested vertical individualism, causing the society’s gravitation towards independence and personally unique status without necessarily submitting to the authority or hierarchy (but when submitting – willingly so).[68] In other words, individual freedom (albeit within the ‘in-group’ with legitimate rulers) is foundational in the Ukrainian national culture.
Russia has invariably been a vertically collectivist country, with this dimension of individualism-collectivism variety being dominant – on individual and societal levels, largely due to the embedded legacy of authoritarianism, from Tsarist to Soviet and post-Soviet times[69]. Studies show authoritarian regimes’ strong propensity to be vertically collectivist –largely manifested through rigid compliance with social norms, deference to authority, and legitimized aggression against deviant behaviors[70].
The nature of Russia's collectivism is such that ‘horizontal’ practices (dialogue, persuasion through explanation and argumentation, encouraging autonomous thinking and decision-making) have been suppressed in that society for centuries. This resulted in the prevalence of ‘vertical’ practices encouraging overt aggressive dominance as a means of getting ahead in social interactions and immediate submission to the imposed authority, with persuasion, upholding agreements, and open information exchange considered signs of the ‘weak’ unstable regimes and unreliable people[71]. Individualism in such a society manifests predominantly on the highest levels of the societal hierarchies – meaning that one has to ‘prove oneself to the in-group’ and to ‘deserve’ the right to self-expression, by dominating and overpowering others.
DIFFERENCE #3. Different role, character, and developmental legacy of institutions in Ukraine and Russia.
Ukraine has historical legacy of complex development of formal institutions, particularly due to the extensive periods of its territory being subject to drastically different ‘treatments’ from the conquering countries. With the dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 and 1795, the territory of today’s Western Ukraine was divided between Russian and Austrian empires after which for 150 years the population has been subjected to rather different ‘influences’ of the respective conquerors: suppression of Ukrainian national identity, language, and culture under Russia and relative support and allowance of practicing ‘Ukrainianness’ under Austria[72]. In 1939, the former subjects of the two said empires were reunited within the borders of Soviet Ukraine, with the country gaining full independence in 1991. These ‘institutional legacies’ of the pre-independence periods persisted well into the modern times, surviving more than 50 years of Soviet rule. In 2013, 25% more Ukrainians in the ‘ex-Russian’ territories willing to be associated with Russia, not Europe, and 15% less – willing to be involved in protests than in ‘ex-Austrian’[73].
The described longevity of social attitudes and behaviors is explained by the strength of the informal institutions in the Ukrainian society – tight local social networks (communities) with strong nodal actors from the local ‘elites’. National identities and associated beliefs, values, and behaviors these actors internalize have been shown to persist practically unchanged, as long as the community persists[74]. In 2022, the only four institutions enjoying the trust of more than 50% of Ukrainians are armed forces (66%), volunteer organization (62%), army veterans (64%), and church (52%), with all types of government institutions, from national police to cabinet of ministers and parliament trusted by less than 20% of the population[75]. This phenomenon of ‘tight networks of trusted people” explains the predominant reliance of the Ukrainians on informal, rather than formal, institutions, and seeking acquaintances or ‘recommended persons’ when interacting with the latter – as ‘insurance’ of sorts, in case the formal institution does not perform its function.
Russia’s pattern of institutional development is drastically different from that of Ukraine – mainly due to the impact of authoritarian legacy on the functioning of institutions. Among the key societal outcomes of authoritarian regimes is suppressed autonomy of the population, with suppressed volition and forced compliance with norms, reflecting the interests of the ‘higher ups’ in the societal hierarchy[76]. This leads to the population’s passivity (36% of Russians score the ability to change their lives at 1-4 on the scale of 1-10[77]), embedded distrust in formal institutions due to their punitive and coercive nature, and resentment of the elites by those at the bottom of the societal hierarchy – to the point when corrupt behavior is viewed as one of the ways to ‘get back’ at or ‘beat’ the system[78]. It is this combination of outcomes that leads to the state of denial of the mass Russian population about the war in Ukraine. “It’s not a war, but a special operation”, “civilians will not be harmed”, “we didn’t attack anyone” – are not just propaganda narratives, these are ‘mantras’ most Russians truly believe because of generations-long brainwashing by ‘people upstairs who know better’.
Another peculiar characteristic of the Russian culture in the institutional context (e.g. superior-subordinate relations) is the link between trust and control, which is drastically different from that of Europe, Ukraine included. In most European cultures, trust and control are mutually exclusive phenomena: the higher the superior’s trust level to the subordinate, the lower degree of control will be exercised to ensure the work is done. In Russian culture, trust and control co-exist and are not mutually exclusive, producing a co-dependent relationship, in which a superior is incapable of fully trusting a subordinate, with the latter expecting, even wishing to be tightly controlled, thus, delegating the agency and the responsibility for their actions and decisions to the former[79].
Evidence from numerous studies shows that Ukrainian and Russian peoples, despite the history of interaction and relative geographical proximity, differ significantly – in terms of state governance legacy, interconnection and type of individualism and collectivism, and pattern of institutional development. In spite of some similarities in cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation, the differing underlying assumptions of Ukrainian and Russian cultures set different paths of how beliefs, values, and behaviors manifest on institutional and individual level. And with the key difference between the two peoples being strong preference of autonomy, decentralized decision-making, and disdain for coercion (Ukraine) and coercive submission, upward-delegated responsibility, and legitimized aggression (Russia), there is nothing ‘fraternal’ about them.
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49. Tella S., The High Context vs. Low Context Cultures. In Tella, S. (ed.) Two Cultures Coming To-gether. Part 3. Theory and Practice in Communicative Foreign Language Methodology. University of Helsinki Department of Teacher Education & University of Helsinki Vantaa Continuing Education Centre. Studia Paedagogica (1996) 10, 22–28, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/339553785_The_High_Context_vs_Low_Context_Cultures.
54. Vadi M., Vereshchagin M., “The deposit of collectivism in organizational culture in Russia: Some consequences of human resources management” (2006), 190-192.
[4] Rumer, Sokolsky, “Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy”.
[5] Beugelsdijk, Welzel, “Dimensions and Dynamics of National Culture: Synthesizing Hofstede With Inglehart”, 1469.
[6] Realo, Allik, Vadi, “The Hierarchical Structure of Collectivism”.
[7] Beugelsdijk, Welzel, “Dimensions and Dynamics of National Culture: Synthesizing Hofstede With Inglehart”, 1497-1498.
[8]Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, 385–472.
[9] Alesina, Giuliano, “Culture and Institutions”, 901-904.
[10] Fürstenberg, Starystatch, Uhi, “Culture and corruption: An experimental comparison of cultural patterns on the corruption propensity in Poland and Russia”, 5-6.
[11] Suhara, “Corruption in Russia: A historical perspective”, 383–403.
[12] Schattenberg, “Korruptes Russland? Russische Verwaltungskultur im 19. Jahrhundert”.
[17] Dartey-Baah. “The impact of national cultures on corporate cultures in organizations”, 5.
[18] Inglehart R., Baker W., “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values”, 40-50.
[19] Kolyshko, Parachchevyn, Yavorsky, “What Ukrainians Think of Human Rights: Assessment of Change”, 15-18.
[20] Brice, Jones, “The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine”, 18.
[21] Kolyshko, Parachchevyn, Yavorsky, “What Ukrainians Think of Human Rights: Assessment of Change”, 15-18.
[22] Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, Kaplan, “Differentiating Autonomy From Individualism and Independence: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-Being”, 100, 103, 104.
[36] Hutchings, Szostek, “Dominant Narratives in Russian Political and Media Discourse during the Ukraine Crisis”.
[37] Brudny, “Why Ukraine is Not Russia”, 817–820, 828.
[38] Dartey-Baah. “The impact of national cultures on corporate cultures in organizations”, Academic Leadership, 5.
[39] Tamilina, “What makes us, Ukrainians, different from Russians? Aspirations for freedom, liberal democracy, and inclusive society as the primary markers for the Ukrainian-Russian divide!”.
[40] Volosevych, “Study of Ukrainians’ And Russian’s Attitudes To One Another”.
[41] A quote by Konstantin fon Eggert, a political observer for ‘Dozhd’ TV Channel in his interview to
https://Hromadske.ua
.
[42] Pastorelli, “Hofstede, Schwartz,… Why to learn them and when to forget them?”.
[43] Hofstede Insights: Country comparison – Ukraine and Russia.
[44] Prašnikar, Pahor, Svetlik, “Are National Cultures Still Important In International Business? Russia, Serbia And Slovenia In Comparison”, 16.
[45] Deichmann, Bohn, “Scandinavian management across cultures - An empirical study of cultural differences between Denmark and Ukraine”, 181-182.
[47] World Population Review-2022, High-context countries.
[48] Tella, “The High Context vs. Low Context Cultures”, 22–28.
[49] Patel, “The Incredibly Smart Reason Japan Is Growing Those Adorable Cube-Shaped Watermelons”.
[50] Bevington Smith, Bond, “Cultures and Persons: Characterizing National and Other Types of Cultural Difference Can Also Aid Our Understanding and Prediction of Individual Variability”.
[51] Acemoglu, Jackson, “Social Norms And The Enforcement Of Laws” (2017), 246-250.
[52] Hofstede Insights: Country comparison – Ukraine and Russia.
[53] Prašnikar, Pahor, Svetlik, “Are National Cultures Still Important In International Business? Russia, Serbia And Slovenia In Comparison”, 16.
[54] Deichmann, Bohn,“Scandinavian management across cultures - An empirical study of cultural differences between Denmark and Ukraine”, 181-182.
[55] McFaul M., “Russia’s Road To Autocracy”, 11–26.
[56] Judah, “The Terrible Truth So Many Experts Missed About Russia”.
[57] Weeks, “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict”, 12.
[64] Tychmanowicz, Filipiak, Sprynska, “Extravert individualists or introvert collectivists? Personality traits and individualism and collectivism in students in Poland and Ukraine”, 5950-5954.
[65] Glinkowska, Chebotarov, “A Comparative Cross‐Cultural Analysis of the Profile of A Modern Ukrainian Manager: the Imperatives of the Future in the Context of Internationalization”, 69-71.
[66] Tychmanowicz, Filipiak, Sprynska, “Extravert individualists or introvert collectivists? Personality traits and individualism and collectivism in students in Poland and Ukraine”, 5950-5954.
[67] Borysenko, “Ukrainian culture: individualism or collectivism?”, 60-62.
[68] Borysenko, “The structure of cultural syndrome "individualism-collectivism" in Ukraine”, 87-88 [in Ukrainian].
[69] Shavitt, Johnson, Zhang, “Horizontal and Vertical Cultural Differences in the Content of Advertising Appeals”.
[70] Kemmelmeier, Burnstein, Krumov, et al., “Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies”, 304, 306, 307.
[71] Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, Kaplan, “Differentiating Autonomy From Individualism and Independence: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-Being”, 98, 104.
[72] Piesakhin, “In History's Shadow: Do Formal Institutions Leave a Cultural Legacy?”, 5-7.
[73] Piesakhin, “In History's Shadow: Do Formal Institutions Leave a Cultural Legacy?”, 21, 24.
[74] Piesakhin, “In History's Shadow: Do Formal Institutions Leave a Cultural Legacy?”, 32.
[75] “Trust of Ukrainians To Government and Social Institutions, Beginning of 2022”.
[76] Kemmelmeier, Burnstein, Krumov, et al. “Individualism, Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies”, 306-307.
[77] Koneva, Chilingaryan, Volosevych, “Mirror of the “military operation”, 6-10.
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Excessive Brotherly Love? – ‘Fraternalism’ of Russians and Ukrainians is Yet Another Russian Propaganda Narrative
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Introduction
Perhaps, no Russia-created myth about Ukraine remains as deeply ingrained in our memory and sense-making as ‘Ukrainians and Russians are fraternal peoples[1]’. Several generations of Ukrainians have grown up being sure they have historic similarities and a connection with Russians that has never really been there. In reality, the statements about ‘fraternal peoples’ are a product of propaganda based on a range of narratives about the countries Russia considers its ‘area of influence’ and has been unsuccessfully trying to return under its control – with Ukraine being one of the countries it’s particularly anxious to ‘make its own again’[2]. Understanding the motivations of Russia, a state with a legacy of authoritarianism[3] and consistently strong ideological opposition to democratic values[4], is key to make sense of such narratives and the logic behind them. For the broader understanding of inherent differences between Russian and Ukrainian peoples, cross-cultural studies provide evidence-based insights, as ~50% of variation in national cultural orientations is unique to the country and is rooted in the lasting differences in historic developmental trajectories – despite the effects of globalization and international economic cooperation[5]. Of particular interest for understanding the said differences is the relationship between individualism and collectivism in Russian and Ukrainian cultures and its respective impact on the institutions, as these dimensions are found to be one of the most distinctive for cultural variation – i.e. responsible for a great deal of differences between national cultures[6]. The purpose of this article is to show, using evidence from cross-cultural studies, that the peoples of Ukraine and Russia differ significantly on the individualism-collectivism dimension and could not be less ‘fraternal’. Considering the relative scarcity of peer-reviewed research on Ukrainian national culture, the conclusions are based on the combination of sources from academic papers, international analytical organizations, and independent media.
As the levee steers the river: how national culture shapes and ‘cements’ a country’s institutions
National culture takes shape in the course of centuries, influenced by the country’s landscape, climate, location, wars and ruling regimes, societal interaction and stratification and is rather path-dependent or, in simple terms, resistant to change[7]. Because national culture repeatedly manifests on individual and societal levels in specific ways, it primarily shapes institutions – the mechanisms of making social choices, distributing political influence, and enduring regularity of behavior, which can be formal (rules, laws, and their enforcement mechanisms) and informal (self-regulation, codes of ethics and conduct, conventions, deeply embedded social norms)[8]. However, once the institutions have developed and taken root, they begin to further ‘steer’ national culture – as the levee steers and contains the river – thus, preventing rapid and abrupt cultural shifts[9]. Because institutions structure social interaction of people by endorsing shared and legitimate understandings of reality[10] (what is happening and what to make of it), unless a profound institutional changes takes place, no significant changes in the national culture can happen.
Let’s take the phenomenon of corruption as an example. Personal networks and clan structures established in Tsarist Russia (which re-emerged among the new ruling classes in Soviet times and then among the political elite in the 90’s) to guard the individual interests of their participants, combined with the deeply embedded attitude of ‘legal nihilism’[11], undermine the functioning of formal bureaucracy and serve as breeding ground for corruption to this day.[12] The general underlying principle behind Russia’s corruption is “enrich those above you in the hierarchy and maintain your loyalty as you work to enrich yourself”[13] – with corruption being a way to climb up the societal vertical, strengthening connections with the ‘right’ people along the way and paying the ‘toll’ to the higher-ups as a token of loyalty. In such a society, appealing to those in power becomes increasingly more important than ‘doing one’s job’[14], and until the pattern of these informal non-transparent relationships persists, it will hinder the development and the functioning of formal transparent institutions.
In case of Ukraine, corruption has different institutional causes – it’s predominantly rooted in distrust in the government institutions’ ability to systemically perform their functions. When Ukraine’s territory was split between Austria-Hungary and Russia, the respective territories followed different development patterns: in the West, the Habsburgs were fostering the Ukrainian community as a counterweight against the Poles, while in the East, the Romanovs suppressed all local identities. Consequently, distinctly different views of Ukraine’s geopolitical role and voting behavior persist today in the respective territories. One has been gravitating towards Russia, the other – towards Europe in terms of national identity, cultural orientation, strength of community bonds, and civic engagement, transmitted largely through informal institutions, such as families and communities[15]. Family and local community, as key ‘circles of trust’, are still the most powerful informal institutions in Ukraine, with the government institutions having the lowest trust ratings since 1991, when Ukraine gained independence, till today: 37.5% of Ukrainians trust in state institutions, 19.8% trust the judiciary, 34.6% trust the police, and 30.1% trust other Ukrainians they meet for the first time (with the exception of the Armed Forces with 70.1% level of trust)[16].
The ’layered cake’ of national culture: how possible is the change and why does it take so long?
To make sense of how national culture can change, one must consider its three levels, which underpin each other and have different ‘modification’ periods.
For the national culture to profoundly shift, change must happen on its deepest level – “underlying assumptions”[17], the sense-making templates society reproduces ‘by default’ from generation to generation, which take centuries to change[18].
For instance, among the underlying assumptions of the Ukrainian national culture is freedom [volya / svoboda] – ability to make important decisions without pressure or coercion[19], characterized primarily by flexible and non-obligatory view of rules and limitations[20] with equality, fairness, and responsibility being less important than freedom[21]. In contrast, among the underlying assumptions of the Russian nationalculture are the lack of autonomy among the population in decision-making and violence as a means of ensuring obedience and deference. Interaction patterns are “vertical” – coercive, rather than ‘horizontal’ – dialogue-based[22]: “forcing instead of convincing”, “imposing instead of explaining”, “compromise equals weakness”[23].
The next level of national culture manifestation in societal interaction and individual sense-making contains “beliefs and values”, the moving principles that ‘signal’ how one should interact with their environment in specific situations and take decades to change[24]. Numerous studies, particularly by Inglehart, Beugelsdijk and Welzel, show – though beliefs and values do shift, this change is not radical, but rather follows the path established by the underlying assumptions of a specific national culture.
The key differences in the beliefs and values of Ukrainians and Russians manifest through the attitudes towards the concepts of leadership, autonomy, and national identity, underpinned by Russia’s legacy of authoritarianism[25] and Ukraine’s lack of such legacy[26]:
Rulers / leaders: In Russian culture, the ability to dominate through substantive and procedural rule-breaking, interfere with subordinates’ preferences the without the need to justify accountability to the them[27] are the key signs of an authoritative figure, and subordinating one’s interests to those of senior ‘in-group’ members is not only normal, but expected by default[28].
In Ukrainian culture, a leader will have authority if the subordinates believe he or she considers their interests when making decisions – a belief that’s been part of the country’s institutional tissue even during the Soviet times[29]. If a leader loses legitimacy, they can be overthrown, which happened regularly in Ukraine’s history, including the three revolutions (‘On Granite’ (1990), ‘Orange’ (2004), ‘Euromaidan’ (2014) during the last 30 years alone.
Population’s decision-making autonomy: According to GLOBE Project data, the key practical manifestation of Russia’s national culture values include inability to obtain the desired result without aggression, low consideration for moral principles and ethics, problem-, rather than performance-orientation, and lack of humane orientation – overall and in leader-subordinate relations[30]. To put it simply, the desired state of Russian masses can be described as the ‘learned helplessness’, when the key life-related decisions are delegated to be made by the narrow circle of high-level people in the respective community and then ‘cascaded’ down for execution with no effort to discuss or persuade – all peculiar to authoritarian states[31].
In Ukrainian society, the ability to make decisions without pressure or coercion is the key criterion of the quality of life – largely due to the tradition of resolving political disagreements through negotiations (not consolidation of power)[32] and strongly regional distribution of political power[33]. Ukrainian culture, though collectivist and hierarchical, is characterized by 56% of citizens expecting the government to provide equal conditions and opportunities with the responsibility of using those resting with each individual and the top-4 values considered most important (after freedom) being fairness, security, equality, and dignity.[34]
National identity: After the USSR collapsed, Russia has lost any remnants of the national idea (which earlier revolved around maintaining the country’s ‘grandeur’ through subduing other countries) and has been trying to 'make itself great again' since then by ‘saving the Russian-speaking people’ in the adjacent countries it considers ‘younger brothers’ who need to ‘return home’[35]. The latest vivid example of the lacking national idea in Russia is the phenomenon of ‘pobedabesiye’ – the meme denoting obsession with Russia’s supposed victory in the ‘Great Patriotic War’ and claim that ‘one nation’ won that war, thus, denying Ukraine’s agency in this fundamental event. It manifests in Russia’s propaganda narratives aimed at justifying its attempts to coercively impose pro-Russian values and culture on Ukraine and juxtaposing Russia and its ‘younger underdeveloped ‘brothers’ [Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova] to the ‘collective West[36]’.
Not only Ukraine has never shown signs of the imperial ambitions or features, but contempt towards anything authoritarian is deeply embedded in its national culture, while the national idea (albeit not formalized and not yet legitimized via public nation-wide discussions) has always revolved around freedom [volya / svoboda], agency, and absence of coercion. Specifically, no overarching nondemocratic national identity emerged in Ukraine after USSR collapse, but competing notions and sources of national identity existed, none being compelling enough to monopolize power and to impose its views and visions on the society as a whole[37].
The most visible level of national culture is “behavior and artifacts”[38], including expectations, norms, and symbols that signify the desired and undesired formats of societal interactions and take years to change. Behavior and artifacts are relatively the most prone to change of all levels of the national culture, however, that change is superficial and non-fundamental. Neither temporary changes in behavior, nor mimicking not shared beliefs and values (even under pressure) are able to change the national culture until its underlying assumptions change.
Among the most vivid differences in the behavioral norms of Russians and Ukrainians is the expression of one’s will and speaking up. Since February 24th, 2022, Russia, with population of ~140 million, demonstrated remarkable population’s passivity and the lack of mass protests, while Ukraine with ~1/4th of Russia’s population has had three revolutions that deeply affected the society in the last 30 years alone. However, there is nothing surprising in such a state of affairs, as Russia is among the most atomized (incongruent) societies in the world, where, as below-quoted studies show, a citizen is, in fact, a ‘subject’ lacking the agency of systemic impact on their life and having no illusions of having it.
VoxUkraine research shows that 87% of Russians (compared to 95% of Ukrainians) declare to feel affiliation with their state (being ‘Russian’ or ‘Ukrainian’), 81% of Russians (and 85% of Ukrainians) feel members of their local communities, 24% of Russians (and 31% of Ukrainians) trust their fellow countrymen with whom they are not personally acquainted[39].
InfoSapiens Research shows that 66% of Russians support the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine, 71% feel the said ‘special operation’ is fair, 69% feel pride, and 64% feel confidence in the ‘special operation’. Only 12% of Russians feel ashamed of the ‘special operation’. 22% of Russians admit the complete inability to influence their own life (10% of Ukrainians feel the same). However, while 30% of Russians believe ‘Russia should stop the ‘special operation’, only 19% said they would stop the ’special operation’ if this decision was theirs to make[40].
Cubic watermelon or ‘I have my washing machine, my summer house is renovated, now where’s my empire?”[41]
If Russia and Ukraine are so different then why do several flagship systems analyzing national cultures[42] (particularly, Hofstede[43], GLOBE, Trompenaars[44],[45],[46], Hall[47],[48]) show these two countries as having nearly identical cultural dimensions and similar trajectories of values’ evolution? The metaphoric answer to this complex question lies in the way Japanese farmers grow watermelons that are convenient to store and transport. In Japan, young watermelons are put in dense cubic baskets[49] and, while ripening, they gain cubic shape, retaining other watermelon-like qualities.
What does national culture have to do with cubic watermelons? – one may rightly ask. See, it’s the country’s institutions that play the decisive role in how its values and beliefs manifest through regular behaviors – the very institutions the country’s culture shaped in the first place[50]. If the country’s formal institutions are effective (perform their function with no need to look for ‘shortcuts’), legitimate (accepted by citizens, not imposed on them), society-oriented (instead of self-preserving at any cost), congruent (do not contradict social norms), and accountable (checks and balances exist), they will function differently and will produce different behaviors than they would, had the said characteristics been the opposite[51]. In other words, formal institutions are only effective if congruent with a country’s beliefs, values, and social norms, which, akin to how the said cubic basket shapes a watermelon, shape the patterns of behaviors peculiar to the specific national culture.
Further quoted research shows that the key (though not all) differences between cultures of Russia and Ukraine revolve around the institutionally ‘programmed’ cultural dimensions on societal and individual levels, though several (not all) dimensions of these two countries’ cultures rank similarly. In Hofstede system, Ukraine and Russia are shown to have comparable levels of power distance (tolerance of power inequality in society), uncertainty avoidance (how threatening ambiguous situations are), and long-term orientation (strength of links between past and present, degree of pragmatism in following traditions)[52]. In Trompenaars’ system, both countries are collectivist, particularistic, emotional, ascription-oriented, and synchronic[53][54].
DIFFERENCE #1. Ukraine is a democracy with disdain for autocracy, while Russia is an autocracy with disdain for democracy.
Russia is an authoritarian state that hasn’t had either significant periods of democratic rule throughout its history, or actionable interest in democratic societal norms[55]. In a personalist autocracy, which Russia is, the key decisions are made by one person (the last dictator of similar type was Stalin[56]), and studies show that only ~12,5% of such dictators lose power relatively quickly and usually through death – with or without help from their closest generals – or coup[57]. For Russia, democracy is an irrelevant and dangerous regime because it encourages autonomous thinking of the wider population, which, consequently, becomes less controllable through pressure and coercion[58].
In Russian culture, it’s not only important to differentiate from others through status, but to dominate over those on the lower hierarchy levels (to the point of resorting to violence) and to demonstrate one’s capability of ensuring deference, which gives access to interaction with those of comparable status[59]; representatives of ‘out-groups’ in such a society are ‘alien’ and, therefore, are ‘enemies’.
Ukraine – on the contrary, has always been fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism, particularly due to historic factors, including frequent change of rulers (local and conquerors) with varying political stances, which have led to distinctly different paths of institutional development, sets of political behaviors and ‘national idea’ views[60]; democratic norms developed in regions that were under Austro-Hungarian rule[61]; active dissident movement of 1960’s, and regionalism combined with consensus-seeking politics that were peculiar to Ukraine on the verge of USSR collapse[62]. Besides, Ukraine has never existed long enough (i.e. centuries) in the same borders and under albeit several generations of similar rulers – to develop embedded approaches to statehood of any kind, let alone authoritarian. Currently Ukraine is classified by Freedom House as a ‘hybrid regime’ (partially free), with a significant freedom-diminishing factor being Russian annexation of Crimea and conquered territories in 2014 and after February 22, 2022[63].
For Ukrainians, it is important to be successful and differentiate from others through status, but focus is on protecting one’s interests rather than dominating over others. All this has to happen in synch with the ‘in-group’ goals[64], belonging to which improves the quality of life and allows to productively interact with (often) ineffective institutions. Sacrificing one’s interests for the those of the ‘in-group’ is not a ‘default’ expectation, but a conscious choice involving consideration of one’s goals and status[65]; representatives of ‘out-groups’ are ‘alien’, but are not necessarily ‘enemies’.
DIFFERENCE #2. Collectivism in Ukraine and Russia is not of the same kind.
Though both Russia and Ukraine are predominantly collectivist cultures (in all flagship systems of cross-cultural analysis), the type of collectivism in these societies is not the same and individualism also manifests differently.
Ukraine historically has been a vertically collectivist society due to the high power distance, relatively conservative and hierarchical orthodox religion foundations, and high uncertainty avoidance, all of which have caused a heightened need to control ‘what happens tomorrow’ and to always ‘save for the rainy day’[66]. Further, the embedded intolerance of authoritarianism and the complexities of territory formation, coupled with parts of Ukraine being occupied by the two culturally different empires have produced the ‘mix’ of the two types of collectivism: vertical (imposed hierarchy, dominance) and horizontal (legitimized in-group hierarchy, dialogue)[67]. This mix of collectivisms in Ukraine is additionally balanced by but notably manifested vertical individualism, causing the society’s gravitation towards independence and personally unique status without necessarily submitting to the authority or hierarchy (but when submitting – willingly so).[68] In other words, individual freedom (albeit within the ‘in-group’ with legitimate rulers) is foundational in the Ukrainian national culture.
Russia has invariably been a vertically collectivist country, with this dimension of individualism-collectivism variety being dominant – on individual and societal levels, largely due to the embedded legacy of authoritarianism, from Tsarist to Soviet and post-Soviet times[69]. Studies show authoritarian regimes’ strong propensity to be vertically collectivist –largely manifested through rigid compliance with social norms, deference to authority, and legitimized aggression against deviant behaviors[70].
The nature of Russia's collectivism is such that ‘horizontal’ practices (dialogue, persuasion through explanation and argumentation, encouraging autonomous thinking and decision-making) have been suppressed in that society for centuries. This resulted in the prevalence of ‘vertical’ practices encouraging overt aggressive dominance as a means of getting ahead in social interactions and immediate submission to the imposed authority, with persuasion, upholding agreements, and open information exchange considered signs of the ‘weak’ unstable regimes and unreliable people[71]. Individualism in such a society manifests predominantly on the highest levels of the societal hierarchies – meaning that one has to ‘prove oneself to the in-group’ and to ‘deserve’ the right to self-expression, by dominating and overpowering others.
DIFFERENCE #3. Different role, character, and developmental legacy of institutions in Ukraine and Russia.
Ukraine has historical legacy of complex development of formal institutions, particularly due to the extensive periods of its territory being subject to drastically different ‘treatments’ from the conquering countries. With the dismemberment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1772 and 1795, the territory of today’s Western Ukraine was divided between Russian and Austrian empires after which for 150 years the population has been subjected to rather different ‘influences’ of the respective conquerors: suppression of Ukrainian national identity, language, and culture under Russia and relative support and allowance of practicing ‘Ukrainianness’ under Austria[72]. In 1939, the former subjects of the two said empires were reunited within the borders of Soviet Ukraine, with the country gaining full independence in 1991. These ‘institutional legacies’ of the pre-independence periods persisted well into the modern times, surviving more than 50 years of Soviet rule. In 2013, 25% more Ukrainians in the ‘ex-Russian’ territories willing to be associated with Russia, not Europe, and 15% less – willing to be involved in protests than in ‘ex-Austrian’[73].
The described longevity of social attitudes and behaviors is explained by the strength of the informal institutions in the Ukrainian society – tight local social networks (communities) with strong nodal actors from the local ‘elites’. National identities and associated beliefs, values, and behaviors these actors internalize have been shown to persist practically unchanged, as long as the community persists[74]. In 2022, the only four institutions enjoying the trust of more than 50% of Ukrainians are armed forces (66%), volunteer organization (62%), army veterans (64%), and church (52%), with all types of government institutions, from national police to cabinet of ministers and parliament trusted by less than 20% of the population[75]. This phenomenon of ‘tight networks of trusted people” explains the predominant reliance of the Ukrainians on informal, rather than formal, institutions, and seeking acquaintances or ‘recommended persons’ when interacting with the latter – as ‘insurance’ of sorts, in case the formal institution does not perform its function.
Russia’s pattern of institutional development is drastically different from that of Ukraine – mainly due to the impact of authoritarian legacy on the functioning of institutions. Among the key societal outcomes of authoritarian regimes is suppressed autonomy of the population, with suppressed volition and forced compliance with norms, reflecting the interests of the ‘higher ups’ in the societal hierarchy[76]. This leads to the population’s passivity (36% of Russians score the ability to change their lives at 1-4 on the scale of 1-10[77]), embedded distrust in formal institutions due to their punitive and coercive nature, and resentment of the elites by those at the bottom of the societal hierarchy – to the point when corrupt behavior is viewed as one of the ways to ‘get back’ at or ‘beat’ the system[78]. It is this combination of outcomes that leads to the state of denial of the mass Russian population about the war in Ukraine. “It’s not a war, but a special operation”, “civilians will not be harmed”, “we didn’t attack anyone” – are not just propaganda narratives, these are ‘mantras’ most Russians truly believe because of generations-long brainwashing by ‘people upstairs who know better’.
Another peculiar characteristic of the Russian culture in the institutional context (e.g. superior-subordinate relations) is the link between trust and control, which is drastically different from that of Europe, Ukraine included. In most European cultures, trust and control are mutually exclusive phenomena: the higher the superior’s trust level to the subordinate, the lower degree of control will be exercised to ensure the work is done. In Russian culture, trust and control co-exist and are not mutually exclusive, producing a co-dependent relationship, in which a superior is incapable of fully trusting a subordinate, with the latter expecting, even wishing to be tightly controlled, thus, delegating the agency and the responsibility for their actions and decisions to the former[79].
Evidence from numerous studies shows that Ukrainian and Russian peoples, despite the history of interaction and relative geographical proximity, differ significantly – in terms of state governance legacy, interconnection and type of individualism and collectivism, and pattern of institutional development. In spite of some similarities in cultural dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation, the differing underlying assumptions of Ukrainian and Russian cultures set different paths of how beliefs, values, and behaviors manifest on institutional and individual level. And with the key difference between the two peoples being strong preference of autonomy, decentralized decision-making, and disdain for coercion (Ukraine) and coercive submission, upward-delegated responsibility, and legitimized aggression (Russia), there is nothing ‘fraternal’ about them.
Publication in Connections Quarterly Journal
FOOTNOTES:
3. Freedom House Country Report-2021, Russia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
World Population Review-2022, High-context countries,https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/high-context-countries
[1] Khaidarova, “Brother or ‘Other’? Transformation of strategic narratives in Russian television news during the Ukrainian crisis”, 1.
[2] Gorenburg, “Russian Foreign Policy Narratives”.
[3] Freedom House Country Report-2021, Russia.
[4] Rumer, Sokolsky, “Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy”.
[5] Beugelsdijk, Welzel, “Dimensions and Dynamics of National Culture: Synthesizing Hofstede With Inglehart”, 1469.
[6] Realo, Allik, Vadi, “The Hierarchical Structure of Collectivism”.
[7] Beugelsdijk, Welzel, “Dimensions and Dynamics of National Culture: Synthesizing Hofstede With Inglehart”, 1497-1498.
[8]Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth”, 385–472.
[9] Alesina, Giuliano, “Culture and Institutions”, 901-904.
[10] Fürstenberg, Starystatch, Uhi, “Culture and corruption: An experimental comparison of cultural patterns on the corruption propensity in Poland and Russia”, 5-6.
[11] Suhara, “Corruption in Russia: A historical perspective”, 383–403.
[12] Schattenberg, “Korruptes Russland? Russische Verwaltungskultur im 19. Jahrhundert”.
[13] Buckley, “Corruption and Power In Russia”.
[14] O’Brien, “Ukraine Has Exposed Russia As Not-Such-A-Great Power”.
[15] Peisakhin, “Living Historical Legacies: The ‘Why’ and ‘How’ of Institutional Persistence – The Case of Ukraine”, 4-7.
[16] Ukraine In The World Values Survey, 5-8.
[17] Dartey-Baah. “The impact of national cultures on corporate cultures in organizations”, 5.
[18] Inglehart R., Baker W., “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values”, 40-50.
[19] Kolyshko, Parachchevyn, Yavorsky, “What Ukrainians Think of Human Rights: Assessment of Change”, 15-18.
[20] Brice, Jones, “The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine”, 18.
[21] Kolyshko, Parachchevyn, Yavorsky, “What Ukrainians Think of Human Rights: Assessment of Change”, 15-18.
[22] Chirkov, Ryan, Kim, Kaplan, “Differentiating Autonomy From Individualism and Independence: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-Being”, 100, 103, 104.
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[74] Piesakhin, “In History's Shadow: Do Formal Institutions Leave a Cultural Legacy?”, 32.
[75] “Trust of Ukrainians To Government and Social Institutions, Beginning of 2022”.
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